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FOREWORD 
This report was prepwed by a panel of experts under the chairman- 
ship of Iprof~ag~r Emile Benoit of Columbia University, at the request 
of John 3. McCloy while he waa Advihler to the President on Dia- 
armament. It was completed and submitted to the United Statea 
Brms Control and Disarmament Agency afbr the latter had been 
created by Congress aa the summer agency to the Disrrrmament 
Administration of the Departmant of State. 
The act eetshhhing the Arms Control end &armament Agency 
spdcal ly  directs the Agency to eonduct research and develop etudim 
regarding "the w n o ~ n i c  . . . ~ ~ u e n ~  of arms control and 
dismament, including the problems of madjmtmente arising ia 
industry and the reallocation of nstiond ~ U P C B B . ' '  The report by 
the Panel on the &onornic Impacts of Disarmament is a first signifi- 
cant development in this area of responsibility, 
I believe the rcpoFt will be of broad interest. The panel of experts, 
who served in their individual cspacitiea, was drawn h m  the U.S. 
Government, from industry, from labor, and from the academic 
community. They have examined the problem of the economic h- 
pact of disarmament on the b& of a disarmament model devised by 
them. They conclude that, while the economic problem which may 
be expected in the event of disarmament are by no maaas insuparable, 
these problem do require the devdopment of seneible adjutmaat 
policies and vigorous government lerrdmbip for solution. They aho 
point out that the impact of diaarmhment would ody accentuate 
structural problem which already exist aa the mdt of technological 
advance and other developments in our economy and that, if these 
pmbl- are overcome, achievernant of major nationd goah will bs - n G 
greatly facilitat-d by the use of the humen and physical reaourcss 
released from the defense program. 
I believe the report will cantribu te to a better undemtsnding of the 
implications of disarmament for the economy, and I hope that its 
publieation will etimulate further ~tudy and ditwion of this vita1 
sspect of disarmament. 
The opinions and conclusions presented in this report am, of mum, 
t h m  of the panel and do not ne~~s9sriIy repment the vie- of this 
Agency or any other sgency of the United States C3avernment. 
WILLKAM C. FOSTER, Dir& 
Unitd States h 8  Control 
and Disarmment Agenay 
WA~RINGTON, D.C., Jam- 1969 
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TRANSMITTAL LEWER 
To THE HOMORABLTC WILLIAM C. F o s ~ ~ n :  
I am pleased to trans~nit llerewith tho report of the Panel 
on Economic Xmpaot~ of Disarmament based on extensive dia- 
cmsiona of our panel dnca laet June, and utilizing rewmh 
mnducted by the Program of b a r c h  on Ehnomio Adjust- 
mente to  Dhrmament, of which I have been the Direator. 
It iB my understanding thet the report is accepted as to ita 
brosd emphwis and mnolueions by all members of the panel, 
although individual membem mkht have some reservations 
with respect to partiaular aanertions, emphasis, or treatment. 
It is understood, moreover, that alI pand membem subscribsd 
to this report only in their individual capacities hnd without 
commitment as to the Government agencies or other organim- 
tiom to which they may belong. 
The report seeks to s u m m ~  the vltrious murw of concern 
within the country as to p i b l e  emnomic daculties arising 
from general and complete dismmament, to project the net 
reductions in defense expenditure (after vsrioue ogsets), and to 
appraiw the likely economic impact under variow wumptions 




Report of the 
Panel on Economic Impacts of Disarmament 
Threats to national security now require an improvement in U.S. 
miIitary capabilitiw. It is important at tbis time to emphasize that 
tbe U.S. Government in no way abandons ib goal of general and 
con trolled diarmamenh under international law with international 
security maintained by a strong international peacekeeping authority. 
The United States has not relinquished the hope that, when it is 
made sufficiently clear that aggression or threab no longer promise 
to achieve any useful result, the gmund wilt be laid for an acceptance 
by all nations of a genuine disarmament agreement in the above 
s e w  in the intereat of avoiding the grave dangers and heavy burdena 
of modern armaments. 
The conclusion of a satisfactory disarmament agreement would 
create serious apprehensions about the potential economic impact. 
While the Soviet Government has recently candad  that the United 
States snd other Western nations could disarm without major or 
permanent ilI effect to their economies, this is by no means obvious 
to public opinion generally, either abroad or at home. There &ta 
a widespread and understandable fear, especially on the part of 
defense industries and workers in thew industri~ and in the m e d  
forces, of the economic disruptions connected with a disarmament 
agreement. 
To dispel misconceived or exaggerated apprehensions, aa well a9 
to help develop appropriate policiw for handling the genuine problems 
involved, it now seems appropriate that the U.S. Government under- 
take a serious and objective study as to the extent to which a dig- 
armament program might have adveme effects and the measures 
which might be raquired to avoid or soften unfavorable economic 
impacte. 
A task force of economic experts drawn from the universities, 
Government, business, and the labor unions has, therefore, been 
assernbled to make a preliminary report on this subject. I& purpose 
hss bean to datemine the chief elementa in the problem, to collect 
and aurnrnwiza the mdts of pmvioua mearch in thia generd area, 
and to eat forth tentative conclusions on the bash of the preliminary 
and partial evidence 80 far available. 
The broad oondusions of the panel put in a very sulnrnnr;\- Imln 
nre as foUa+: 
(a) That disarmament of the type, and at the pace whi& the 
pand considem to be implied by the United Stat= Program for . 
General and Complete Disarmament in a Pemfui World, submitted 
to the United Netions on September 25, 196l-after allowance for 
pmpamd expansion in National Amnautiw and Space Administration 
(NASA) and civilian Atomic Energy CommiAon ( m C )  programs 
and the requirements of disarmament inspection and international 
peace e n f o r c e m e n ~ o d d  mate small danger of provoking im- 
mediate depression in our economy, aasurning sensible adjustment 
policies and vigorom Govement leadership to dispel adveme elTects 
on business and consumer anticipations and to provide remursnce 
that w e g a t e  demand will not be dowed to decline precipitantly; 
(b) That a steady decline in dafenm spending spread over several 
years may prow a significant drag on the economy md pose seriou~ 
problems for policpakers. Thm problems can be mastered by the 
application of appropriate policies, the chief obstacle9 to which 
would be political r&st.ance rather than deficiencim in our econoinic 
knowledge ; 
(c) That structural problems in particular induatrim or a m  are 
unavoidable and eould be serious for the individuale, companies, and 
communitia prominently affected; 
(d) That the alleviation of these structural difficulties may require 
a variety of adjustment programs, aome providing mistance for the 
retraining, temporary support, and relocation of individuals and 
reconversion and diversification of enterpriees, some promoting the 
importation of new indwtries into areas hard hit by the closing of 
defense planta and installations, and some, perhaps, seeking new 
publicly suppord uaa of national importance for part of our existing 
defema resources, particularly our capabilities in research and 
development ; 
(e) That included in the latter category might be research and 
development progra~na on twhnological bo ttIenecks impeding in tar- 
national economic devdopment, which could also make a significant 
contribution to one of our major f o w  policy objectives; 
(f) That the impact of diar~nament would only accentuate s t rue  
turd problems which dmdy exkt and which will have ta be solved 
myhow if the nation f ta produce up to ite Ed pobntiditim; 
(g) That if these probjerna are overcome, achiavernent of major 
national goals win. be greatly fncili bted by the uae of the humm a d  
msteFial resources demed from the defense program; 
(h) That within wide limits the Nation am dord to have as high 
or as Iow a level of defenae expenditure as is deemed pohtidy d h b l e  
and should feel no consbsint on the economic side in adjusting defense 
expenditures to whatever level seems beat to accord with our politid 
objectivee. However, advance planning by Qovernment at dl lev& 
and by bueiness firms, labor uniom, and- other private orgmiaetiom 
is required if the economy is to adjust smoothly to eignificant c-8~ 
in the level of defense spending, particularly auch as would wult from 
gene& and complete disarmament. 
The Problem 
The chief pubIic can- about the egects of disarmament ia the 
poadbili ty thtlt it might create a sudden and severe decline in emnomic 
activity, i.e. depression. Another danger, of a l w  dramatic but 
possibly more realistic character, is that a sustained decline in defense 
expenditurea could impair the long-term stability and growth of our 
economy. Another obvious and unavoidable problem is that certain 
companies, industries, workere, and cummunitiea that are heaviiy 
involved in defenw activit i~ may face serious structural readjustment 
problems even if overall demand can be kept high and no general 
decline occurs. Shifting people and resources b new us- takes time 
and may well create considerable hardship for the parts of the economy 
that have to make the shifts. 
The reasons for concern can be eet forth briefly. The defense 
program a h r h  nearly a tenth of the total U.S. production of goods 
and servicas and emplop, directly and indirectly, a like percentage 
of the labor force. (This is inclusive of personnel in the Armed Form 
and in the Defense Department.) 
In some industries the dependence on defeme employment is 
wpecially high. Approximately 95 percent of the employment in 
aircraft and missilea, 60 percent in ship and boatbuilding, and 40 
percent of the ernploment in radio and communications equipment 
is dependent on defense  expenditure^. On the other hand only 0 
The tabh referred to below el.e carried at the end of the report. 
percent of empIoyment in hamportation, 2 percent in construction, 
and leas t h n  1% percent in t.r%de and sefyim is similarly dependent I 
on the defense <rogram ; and much of this dependen& is ikdirect. 
(See Table I.) 
In some areas of the country the dependence on defense production 
is already very tangible and a serious source of concern. For ex- 
ample, in 19b9 missile and aircraft production provided at least 82 
percent of the manufacturing employment in San Diego, 72 percent 
in Wichita, 53 percent in Seattle, and 27 percent in tho h Angel* 
b n g  Beach area. Certsin States are de~r ly  subject to dimpropor- 
tionately hwvy economic impaeta becpuae of the relatively heavy 
dependence of their manufacturing an 'major items of procurement , 
Table PI shows 14 States with above-average dependence on major 
procurement for their employment, and 9 additional States with 
exceptionally heavy dependence on Department of Defense (DOD) 
paSrnlls to sustain their income. Kansas, Waahingtan, New Mexico, 
California, and Connecticut appear as the cases of most severe relative 
dependence on defense manufacturing, with 20 to 30 percent of their 
manufacturing employment in major procurement ; Alaska, Hawaii, 
District of Columbia, and Virginia have the heaviest dependence on 
DOD payrolls, with 10 to 20 percent of their income supplied by 
military pay and allowances or civilian wages and salaries. It is 
disquieting to note that s m e d  of the States with hmvy dependsnw 
on major procurement for employment are aIso well above the aver- 
age for dependence of income on Department of Defenee payrolls. 
This is notably true for New Mexico and Utah, but it is also true to 
eome extent for Kansas, Wmhington, and California. 
Moreover, it appeara that def~ase expenditure are particularly 
important in precisely those industriw, notably the electronics and I 
aerospace industries, that have shown the mmt rapid pattern of I 
growth and technological innovation and provided a large share of 
the support for rmesrch and development. The def enss program now 
f i n a n c ~  about half of all industrid rwearch and development and 
one-fourth of all pure research. 
m 
The projected earnings of firms heady engaged in the defense 
program have been very highly capit.dized in the stock market, and 
the present level of their common stock value would appear to ba 
quite vulnerable in the event of any major reduction in defetls~ 
expenditures. 
Moreover, the industrid character of the defense program hw been 
changing in W S , ~  that may intensify the probla~rl of adjustment in 
major defense cutbacks. By contrwt wit11 the situation during 
World Hfar 11, ud evwl the Kor~an War, a larger share of defenee 
industry today is in the hauds of highly spmializd defense contractom 
whoas products hear little resemblance ta any civilian items, who have 
limited mperience ouhide of defense production, who h ~ v e  never 
"wt~verted" from civilian production, and for whom entry into pro- 
duction of civilinti end-item would t y p i d y  involve not so rnuch 
"reconversion" as radical divemZcation. Their attempta to date to 
get into civilian lines of production have been frequently unprofitable, 
Some people aIso fear, rightly or wrongly, that our economy has 
suffered certain changes since the 1945-53 period rss r@ both 
structure and demand and that them changee might make it more 
sensitive to deflationary stimuli and I- capable of eusy and automatic 
readjustment to cu tbbcks in defense demand. 
la attempting to project the mnotnk impact of diearmamant, it 
is h t  of dl n v  to have a mwont~bly h + u t  set of assump- 
tions about the nrrture and timing of the disarmament proass. 
While thesemattms are and wiIl continue to be the aubject of negotia- 
tion, the ultimata outcome of which cm hardly be prediated st this 
stage, it is nonethelaw newsmy to make wumptions about the 
g e n d  character of the disermammt p r o m  with respect at Iewt 
to thoee factors tht  wjjl have a decided economic impact. 
The disarmament assumptions we d in making our projwtions 
are intended to be generally consistent with the major U.S. disarm 
, ment objectivm and policim as set forth in the proporala p m e n t d  
by the President to the United Nations. The model was, however, 
d-ed by the panel. The timing and ph- of &armament used 
in the model are, in the judgment of the penel, the optimum that a n  
realistically be expected from the nagotktion md impIementation 
of general and complete &armament in view of the fundamenbd 
and complex factors invoIved and in vim of the negotiating history 
of recent yeare. However, the spmXc m m m  and dam aseumsd 
in the model involve mat- upon which determinations of US. 
policy have not yet been made. 
With a different concept or model of karmament, the aconornic 
implications might be considarably altered. For example, an arms  
control agmmmt involving a major change in the weapozu9 mix might 
involve so reduction in defame expenditure and, becaw of the heavy 
new inspection cosb, might even make for mme net inoraase in mili- 
b y  budge&at l w t  tor a tine. Similarly, a crash disarmament 
program, such as might arise out of a crisis situstion described by 
T. C,  SafialIing under the heading "Reciproqd Fear of Su~priae 
Attack," or a region-by-region sequential disarmament pattern aa 
suggreetec! by Lo& Soh, would considerably change the economic 
impat. Such more remob dtsmativea have been ig~~ored here, to 
mncantmte on the e b l e  implications of mom conventional con- 
ceptions of diearmament. 
Even within such a conception, some of the elemate are monomi- 
ally more strategic than others. Any important changm made wikh 
- respect to t h m  dementa during the mume of negotiation of 8 dh- 
m.wnent agreement could, in m e  degree, undermine the projec- 
tions and d y m  of this report. 
One crucial assumption in this mnse ie with respect to the dste of 
the cutof€ in new production of delivery vehicles and nuclear war- 
heads, Another is the pwe of dernobjlization of personnel. Another 
is the magnitude m d  type of inspection, police, and detarrent forcea 
astabhhed under &n international control organization (or, as the 
Sephmber 25 plsn Gslla it, I.D.0.-International Diearmamen t 
Orghation) and mponaible for administering and enforcing the 
disarmament agreement. The rate and timing of the buildup of such 
form~ is likewise very important. (It hould ba notd that the cast 
of the inspection service is a particuIarly uncertain item, with a very 
wide dispemion of estimates among experta with respect to the type 
and amount of impaction activities and equipment and even with 
respect to the probable msta of particular inspection systems.) 
Another assumption af obvious importance is with mpect to the total 
duration of the disarmament program. Findy, the projected sever- 
ity of the disarmament impact will & be affectad by the assumptione 
with reape& to the size of the national forces at the beginning of tlie 
program and after diearmament is completed. 
Our model is in line with informal aetinitrtes of 1965 defense ex- 
pendituree ae f a n g  withii the range of $50 b $60 billion. We have 
used the upper end of thia range in order to reduce the likelihood that 
our projections of dimernmen t impacts would underestimate the 
axtent of the problem. With respect b othor mnomically st.rategic 
assumptions mentioned above we have sought to choose those wump- 
time which mem nlmt in line 6th the oBcial disarmament prop04 
hnd bava checked the quantitative estimates with the opinion of 
experte wherever possible-adopting compromise figures wherever 
the range of expert opinion waa i t d f  very wide. 
The disarl~lelnent rt~odd adopted by the panel for the puqmm of 
tlris report., rand ib i~~~plicntions for U.S. security expenditures- 
natianal and in tmational-me shown in Table UX , In approximate 
terms, it projects a decline in defenae expenditure of $17 billion (I 080 
dollars) in the fiwt 3 years, a further d d i n e  in national defense pro- 
grams in the second stage of $12 billion partly offaet by a $3.5 billion 
contribution to international inspection costa, and so forth (i.e., a 
net duction of a b u t  $8.5 billion), and a further net reduotion in the 
third (two-phase) stage of $1 3.5 billion in the laat 6 yearn. The total 
net reduction in U.S. security expenditurn (after dlowmce for the 
U.S. contribution to the costa of an international organizetion respon- 
sible for inspection, police, and detment functions) would thus be 
about $38.5 billion over a 12-year period, with roughly $6 billion a 
year in the initid 3-year period. 
Thae cutbacks might be partly offset by a buildup in c d u h  
programs which have baen closely d a t e d  with our defense e#mt 
in the past, such ss the NASA and the ~~ AEC prognuno. The 
pqaections with respect to these programs ahown in Table III include 
an allowsnm for the NASA moan program m t l y  announced, 
et  cetera. If the re* projections prove +tic, the offwh 
provided by the expaasion of both "nsmciated progrrune" together 
would be cl-e to a total of $2.5 billion over the initial 3-year period 
of meximum defense cutbacks, The total expansion of these progrsms 
over the whole disarmament program is estimated at $6.8 billion, based 
on existing plans. If thae progrntns are accelemted between now and 
1965, this could mdt in a slower pace of buildup between 1065 and 
1977 than m u m d  in our model but would more likely be wocisted 
with a companding incresse in the aim of the 1977 program so that 
the projected increase between 1965 and 1077 might not be mtly 
changed. Our  projection^, incidentally, do md involve additional 
e p w  programs which might be ndopted a9 ~p&c diaarmammt 
oiTaeta* 
If we take account of the d ~ t  provided by the cmb of bpection 
forces and the buildup of the NASA and civilian AEC pro@-, we 
find a net reduction in U.S. security and d a t e d  expendituree of 
abut $22 billion in the h t  6 years, with only about $5 billion a year 
during the cmual introductory 3-yew pesiod of mardmurn impact. 
The Fear of Depression 
The chief popular economic fear of disarmament i that i t  might 
suddenly bad to a severe depression, Thii seeme to us a rather im- 
probable contingency, wuming the relatively slow pace of the auk- 
as set forth herein and the strong likelihood of eome offsetting policies. 
A net reduction of defen'ee axpenditu~ of only about $5 billion a year, ' 
or lew than 1 percent of the gmas national product, oven in the initial 
period of maximum impat,  would be a far smaller percenae of the 
GNP than waa represented by the post World War II and post-Korean 
defense cuta, whi& for a time were, respectively, 30 percent and 3 
percent of GNP. 
It would, of course, be pwible in the absence of further mtnpensa- 
tory sction for an initial deflationary net impact of even $5 billion a 
year to cause a erioua slowdown, via the action of tbe multiplier. 
Under these conditions, the reduction in defense spending would be 
reflected in reduced inaolnes for employees of the defense industries 
and of the industries supplving, directly and indirecdy, the defense 
contractors. Profits {after taxes) in t.heae industriw mould & be 
reduced, and this almost cortllinly would be reflected in some cutbank 
in dividends. Declines in personal incornea would be mitigated by 
reduced taxw ttnd increased transfer payments, but, given exiding 
laws, a dollar reduction in dofensc spending would cause a fall in 
disposable income Ieading to abut  a dollar reduction in persond 
consumption. In addition, the decline in aggregate demand would 
lead to a reduction in capacity and inventory requirement8 and thus 
to some fdhff in investlnent, As a result, a $5 billion yedy  cutback 
in defense spending might well generate a tot$ decline of aggregate 
demand of between $10 billion and $12 billion a year, if m~npensating 
policies were not brought in b play. 
Yet it is hard to believe that we would stand by idly and let the 
nlultiplier have ib full impuct by failing to take sarne further com- 
pensatory action. Public pr-ures would be strong to reduce twes 
and to permit the expansion of some high priority nondefense Govern- 
~tlent progratns that are being kept on ice durillg the period of lmvy 
defense: budgets. It seems unlikely that wa woulrl repeat tho ~nistt~ke 
made in 1853-54 when F d m d  nondefense e.xpcnditure-9 were cut by 
ovor $2 billion at the very ti~ne th& heavy cuts were being made i t t  
defense. (It should be noted, moreover, that tax cuts and relaxtition 
or rnonetury policy in 1954 prevanted the GNP fmru declining as intrch 
as ~nilitwy spending, i,e., in effect, the multiplier effects were lrloro 
than off~et.) 
Perhaps the chief danger of a precipitmt decline would be psycho- 
logicat. We would be Iacing an extended of fu turn defense cuts 
over more than a decade ahead. We have never hed a situation err- 
actly pardel to this in our history, and we cannot be sure just how 
this wodd affect businem and consumer anticipations and expenditure 
plans. Pmsimism might be heightened by 8 major break in ~tock 
market prices, which, aa indicated above, would be likely to occur at 
such a time. 
A great d d  might depend on whether the Government could pm- 
vide sac ient  reussuranee by demonstrating that a definite program 
of offsets had baen readied and would be promptly implemented. 
In this connection, people's expectations would be mnsidembly af- 
fected by their experience in the years prior to disarmament. If pub- 
lic policy hsd a c c e d e d  in reducing m d v e  unemployment and 
restoring a rapid rate of growth, the economy could more readily 
abaorb deft ationary impacB without serious hurt, and ooddence in 
he Government's power ta protect pmperity would be higher. On 
the whole, it is our judgment that a h r p  letdown during disarma- 
ment mrndna unlikely and should be &voidable if the Government 
exercbm a modicum of economic sense, foresight, and courageous 
leademhip. 
Long-Term Adequacy of Demand 
Dealing effectively with the year-by-yew declines in defenae ex- 
penditure may be much more djfEcult. It wi l l  be a problem to 
maintain suficient aggregate demand to utilize the muroes  being 
released year d t e r  year by the dsfenae program as well m the rapid 
expamion of our industrid potential. In prsrticul~, we appear to 
be in for a period of exceptionally rapid growth in the labor force, and 
some authorities believe we may also be on the threahhold of a period 
of exceptionally rapid productivity advances. Yet failm to find 
constructive use for our growing reaourcea might be apecidly dm- 
gerous in a postdisarmament situation because the international 
rivalry between the free end regimenkd societies might centm to an 
cvea larger extent than at present on their respective economic per- 
formances and their ab'dity to supply aid and leaderehip in inter- 
nt~tiond economic develo prnen t. Certainly a continuing and g~owing 
burden of excess une~nployment and a marked failure to mtam a 
rapid growth of industrial output could graveiy affect our inter- 
national prestige ILS well as impair our domestic morale. 
Some ramstmnce may be found in the dative s u m  of the 
dermobiliaation experience after World Wrrr I1 and dter Korea. Yet 
these expdmcea (especially the former) m m d  undar conditions 
dciently different from thorre prevailing now, or +bly prevailing 
&t the time of 8 future &armament, that their relevance is open to 
queetion. Nor were theee BD unqufiedly au- tbst 
B repetition would f d y  meet our requiremenb in the k t ies .  
The Gtuation in 1946 was one of hyperliquidity and repreesed 
idation, based eaeentidly on $265 billion of wartime deficit hmcing 
in conjunction with war-imposed shorhgea. This had contribut& 
to an abnomd rise in  saving^ md coneumer liquidity during the war 
y m .  The asvings rate roae to over 26 percant in 1944, and total 
personal savings accumulabd during the war yeam totaled over $160 
billion. With the &srp d&e in f i e  rste of wvhgs after the war 
(it fell ta the k h l y  abnormal low of 2.8 v n t )  and with a rapid 
rise of consumer debt (from the very low level of 4.5 percent of di% 
pmable personal income), there was tr tripling of expenditurea on 
consumer durabIes and a tenfold increase in nonfarm midentid 
construction between 1944 and 1948. In m n t  yeam conaurner debt 
hae been running at around IS percmt of diepoeable income md the 
eavings ratio has &own great stability at levels between 0 and 8 per- 
cent. There is h p l y  nothing in our recent experience suggmting 
that a u ~  comparable jump in comumer expenditure h a n d  out of 
savings or consumer debt is in the c a d  in the event of defense cut- 
b a h .  (This does wt imply, of mume, that consumer e ~ p e n d i t m  
will not increme rapidly if dispaeable income is raisgd fast enough0 
Moreover, while ths 1945-48 reconversion was mmplished with 
an unexpectdy low rate of unemployment, it did involve harp 
declinca in the total labor force, hours of work, land industrial output. 
Thme reductions were a reaction to the rebation of the unusual 
m o m i c  pmure  of the mnr years. In a paamtime situation in the 
1960'8 such a decline in the supply of labor is to be neither expwted 
uor welcomed. 
The pt-Korean demobfiation, set @mt ~m optimistic back- 
ground of full employment, recant inflationary price trends (in 19Sl), 
rapidly rising equity value43 in homes, and a stiD fairly low level of 
consumer debt, was not without mme ~u~ wpecthl. With 
the d&e of about one-third in thr red U.S. defense c:penditurw 
from 1953 to 1960, industrid output (which had risen 54 percent from 
1946 to 1963) m e  only 18 percent from 1953 to 1960. The $6.7 
billion caeh surplu~ in 1956 and 1967 WM asso&td with a marked 
decline in the growth rats and a subshatid increwe in the year-in- 
ywrr-out rate of unemployment. These remarka, of course, do not 
imply that the U.S. economy requirm rising defmse expenditura to 
pmper. They do s-t, on the other hand, that fdure to nupply 
adequate offmta for d a f m  cuts may imw severe rastrictione on the 
attainable rate of growth. 
Popular beliefa and attitudm reapbnaibIa for our failure to provide 
adequate offsets to d e f e n ~  cuh in the past may well contiriue to give 
UE some trouble in the future. One BU& attitude is the fesr of ids- 
tion, which may rwult in deliberate &or&- to restrain incraw in 
demend lest too grmt opportunities be thereby afforded for p d u m r  
elements ta r&e coats. Another relevant attitude ie an antipathy to 
budget deficits and national debt and a conviction that at even a 
rndw6hly high level of employment, and before full employmaat and 
repid growth have been reskumi, we should consider owdvea morally 
obligated to try to achieve a budget surplus for reduotiom in the 
national debt. 
There is at least some evidenca that attitudee of this sort might 
larrd to attempts to reduce the national debt during a pemod of major 
def- cutbacks. A recent s w a y  conducted by the Univdty of 
Michigan Survey Research Center, on behalf of the R e s d  Program 
on h n o m i c  Adjustmmb to Dkrmament, found a strong public 
attitude fav* the use of defense mvinga for national debt reduction, 
wibh 20 percent of the ralpndenta choosing it aa the beat use for such 
savings and mother 15 percent naming it as their eetlond choice. 
Thie ma of defense savings WFIS far more popdm than an expanded 
foreign aid p w a m  and just as popular as a reduction in income tax=. 
Respondents with mllege education were pnrtidarly strong for debt 
reduction, 
It may be assumed that such sttampte to obtain a surplus for debt 
reduction would have a deftationsrg &ect even though aome offset 
might be provided by the lrotual me of the surplm to reduce the 
national debt, if the rmulting increaae in investor liquidity and expan- 
&on of bank r-ee would facilitate private borrowing and inveat- 
ment. Except under unuauaI S ~ t i o n n r y  wnditiom the net effect of 
obtaining the surplus together with using it to reduce the national 
debt would, however, be dearly deflationary. 
Even if adequate o&t memura we. approved there xnay be in- 
stitutional difficulties in having them implemantd quickly enough 
to neutr&e the effect of the cutbwh. In thb mnnection it 
important to note that the economy responde sharply not ody W 
Wimw t & j k e  aqamditzw8g, but a h  to & c l h  $m &fme o d r s . 4  
TO do the moat good theretore, ofbtting meas- should, if possible, 
be initiated, at the very time &at defenae contmcta are c a n d d  and 
before defense expenditmnot  to speak of actual production and 
employment-begin to drop. The complex and elow-moving ma- 
chinery of Congrm, and its need tb mnsider mas- from the pint 
of view of regional and hcd int-ts, would appear to make m y  
such anticipabry response mcdt or immssible. Much depends on 
congressional w i h g n ~ ~ ~  to grant the executive branch adequab 
dhmetionary authority to accomplish nuch an objective, e.g., in the 
form of ~tandby public works or h x  reduction b i  to be implemented 
only under conditions specSed by the Congress in advance, or in 
b m d  wngreasiond authorization to the Raeident b make limited 
changes in certain tsx rates for stabilization purpo8es as propod in 
the recent report of the Conmidon on Money and Credit. 
A heavy emphasis on tm cuts as a stabilizing measure may en- 
munter additional di&cultiea. Subtwtial tax cub Will mise fund& 
mental questions of tax equitv ss betweon v h o w  dawea of tax- 
payers and complex quwtiona of tax eEciency and the need for tm 
reform. AB a mnlt, it may prove di&cult or importeible to time 
tax cuts m as to provide a s~f~ciently prompt and adequate o&t to 
defense cub. Furthermore, owing to the operation of the ''balanced 
budget multiplier," a reduction in Govehment expenditure, even if 
exactly matched by a decline in taxes actually couected, will not pro- 
vide quite as much of a stimulus tO the economy as i lost by the 
d e c h  in public expenditure? To provide adequate ohte ,  therefore, 
tax reductions would have to be even greater than the net reductiow 
in Government expenditure, raising the politically sensitive imue of 
delibarate deficit financing, and possibb encountering the trouble- 
some obtacle of the national debt ceiling. 
* Thw in 1953, btween the second and fourth qu&em them waa a dsDUne of 
$2.8 billion in defense obliptions for hard goo&, with an w t d  drop of 
1 . 7  billton in now orders rewived by the dursble goode indmtrie~ and r 4.3 
percent d&e in induetrid produotion. Yet actual defenae expijndittuw in tha 
fourth quarter were only about half a W o n  lower tban hi the m n d  q&- 
Apin in 1967, between tb &at and third quarters there wan s $1.6 billion dealbe 
in defense obligations for hard goods, with $5.6 billion decline in new orders 
rewived by the durable goods iudmtriw. By the laat quadm of tbe y w ,  in- 
b W  proddon had drop@ & by 5.9 pement deepite the fact that the dollar 
value of national defense e*penditw had been rising and wan a W  mnnlng 
aligbtly ahead of fbe 0mt quarter. 
a % Is fundamentally due fo the faot that a portion of the inereaaed dhpmbble 
borne will not Immediately be tmdated in* higher apenditure. 
A second kind of diEou2ty that might arise if the o h t a  to defem 
cuta were mainly in the form of tax cub is related to the p d b l e  
didvrmtagm of functioning with a prmauahly d m  public 
mctor in the emnomy--at least d m  relatively to total ONP. It 
is g e n d y  agreed that the g~eatly enlwged pubh wtor simx 
World War IT, d t i n g  from heavy defame expendit-, has pm- 
vided additional protection agaimt dapdons ,  ehca this mtor is 
not mpomive to contraction in the private &r and pmvidea a 
sort of b d e r  or balm- w h d  in the amnomy. The high tax rate 
requiwd by this high level of Qov~~nmmt eqendibww pmvidea 8 
large volume of menu9 which iEl very ~ns i t ive  to ohmgp in income, 
so that ahocka to the economy are in good part abaorhd in d&em 
in tax= rather than in incame. A reduction in the &e 
of the public m c h ~  would weaken this type of protection. 
The above long mtalog of m b l e  diflicultietr which may be en- 
countered in maintaining adequah aggregate demand for rspid 
growth in the dbmmament period is not intended to imply that we 
a;re faced with any fstsl inevitability in thia respect. h is dearly 
implied in our description of the problems to be enmnntared, the 
eseential ewnomia of the Gtuation do not create the difl6cultim eo 
much as do the institutional and attitudind limitations of an eaamti- 
ally politid chsracbr. It follows that, with a r a c i e n t  w i l h g n ~ ~ ~  to 
embark on new offsetting nondefense progrruns d / o r  to cantemplate 
drsstic tax reductions to the fuU extent nmaaarjr to o h t  defenw 
cute and without regard to budget balancing or national debt redua 
tion objectivm, there need be no mbstantial problem in maintaining 
any level of demand required to employ our expanding reso- for 
civilian production. We have, indeed, a comidersble degree of choice 
as to just how we wish t~ do it. 
It ia hgMy d&able that the Oovernment prepare well in advmce 
detailed measures for disarmament adjuetment, so that they ahodd 
be available in time and ao that they ahodd be of a cham~ktr which 
promotes our long-range objectives. This will permit ua to take 
advantage of the great opportunities which dhmament will aord 
lor the improved allomtion of our mmxs and wiH help to prevent 
our rasdjuatment mew- baulg too much influenced by mnsiders- 
tions of expedienay and by short-run politid p ~ ~ g ~ w a .  In this 
context the potentidties for expanded and improved  program^ in 
the fields of education snd march, transportation, urban renewal, 
public health, et cetern, should be carefully explored, as well aa t h m  
of tax reductions, cuntributing not ody to an oxpadon of printe 
demand but dm to a strengthening of private invmtment incentives 
and muroee. Advance disctuxion of suah messuree would be helpful 
in preparing s bet* informed public opinion, neither unduly f e d u l  
of disermrunmt adjustments nor mmplacent to the point of denying 
the need for advance prepmatiom for handling h e  probl~m~ that will 
arb .  Such &ion mill alsO make dear the fact that we do have 
important alternatives in the way the problem ia handled and that 
various pomible combinations of adjwment programs which might 
su5c-e to promote a mooth adjustment may have quite different 
long-run affects on our future growth rates and the apscity of the 
pddharmamen t economy to  meet our broader long-tern objeetivea. 
The major problem of policy p h n i q  would IM to choose a policy 
which, h t ,  ia suflieient to prevent aeriws unemploymant and B X ~  
capacity and, m n d ,  will guide the hbor and reaourma freed by 
disarmmemt to w h m  the n& sre determined to be great&. 
There is a wide range of fiaetrl and monetary policiee which have a 
comparable impat on aggregate demand but d8-t efFecta on the 
composition of output and on the docation of remurcm among 
competing needs. The balance m h c k  between tax reduction and 
incraaaed Qovernment spending wil l  be governed by the relative 
importance eccurded to private demand for auch g d a  and sawicea 
rn food, clothing, housing, rw~eaGon, health, higher eduation, 
m&e tools, mwrch, and developmenbas againat public demand 
for school mnstruction, h a h a  training, mds, spaw exploration, 
urban r e n d ,  area rdeveloprneut, public hedth, and socid awvicea, 
et  a k a .  Policy will also have to etrlke the appropriate balance 
be twm those m w w a  that =tidy preaent wsnb and  tho^ that 
promote the long-tarm dynamic growth of the economy. 
It IJ130 W O U I ~  be m b l e ,  at I w t  in theory, to "take up the slack" 
by b h g h g  about a reduction in working how, an inmeme in the 
length of vacations, a reduction in the average age of retirement, 
e riae in the average age at which young people start looking for jobs, 
and a reduction in the proportion of women aeeldng jobs. I t  b not 
claw ta what egtent Qovmment policy can mdily influence wme of 
thee choices, nor how much mistance such policies would enwuntm.' 
Since euch policim, if dative, would facilitate the Soviet objective of 
utching . up with U.S. indust&l output, their international implieu- 
tiom should be carefully comidered bsfore &ring them any endom- 
4 Thwe is some evidence which 8uggeatB that the marginal preference for 
leisure over fn~ome may be low w negative wen among those already employed 
full time. The Bureau of Labor Btabiatiea dm projects aaonttnli J rapid ex- 
don in the numbr of women in the labor force, and there is no indication of any 
subetantid trend toward earlier drwnent .  
ment. how eve^; pramurm far reduction of working W to epread 
empIoyment would be ~trong if the only alternative amihb1e were 
1- of an equivalent number of man-horn through nnemployment. 
But contmv~f~y over the beat use of the available munxa would 
serve the Nation poorly if it distracted trtterr tion from the fanhmtsl 
importanm of rwhg than one way or mother, snd aaiqg them d, 
and if it were made an excuse for inaction or dday in taking the 
fundamental memum that mmm that a m  conetrudv~ urn will be 
made of the rwuroee b d n g  available. h u m  of bhe inhwent 
i n ~ n f l s c t ~ e m ~  of the different parta of the grollg national product 
(QNP), an axpamion in any one m h r  is likely to bring about ax- 
pansion in the 0th- as well, u n l a  subject to exceptional reetzictions 
(as in wartime). It should be s b e m d  that if we do not handle the 
aggregate demand problem adequately, the queation ES to prioritits 
of ww of our mtma has little dgnibnce. However, if we do handle 
the aggregate d p m d  problem well, dhrmment affords en un- 
m n W  opportunity for ~~ our most pm&ng n 4 n  if the 
newasmy meeauree m prepared in time. 
Structural Problems 
It seem entirely possible that aome of the mmt stubborn and 
dillicult problems connected with disarmement will be thme arieing 
from the concentration of persons and pmductive mources in par- 
ticular induetries, areas, or vomtional p u p  and from the S c u l t i e s  
of making the necessary ~h i f  ta in employment ~ n d  m u m e  utilization. 
To be sure, many of thme shifts will be emilq. made through f ie  
spontaneous and unaided sction of individuals xsponding to the pull 
of free msrket foms. The aucmm of this type of adjustment pmceee 
dl be gratly facilitated if a h i  level of demand is maintained. 
Them is leee inmntive to move or to retrain if unemployment is 
endemic and society derives little benefit from adjustment ~ C E S S B B  
which provide job for some people only by taking jobs from othm. 
N e v e r t h d ~ ,  even under conditions of full employment opportunity 
some of the adjuetrnent pmceasee will be dificult for the individuals, 
ampanits, and communitim concerned, and aome Qovernment meas- 
ura to asgist in this p m x a  may be morally jwtilied, economidy 
mund, lrnd politidy inevihble. 
The employment phaae of the rendjuetrnent may be complicated 
by the fsct that the labor force will be expanding with exceptional 
rapidity and Iabor displacement through automation may alee be 
advancing with great speed. It should be noted that the spmd of 
automation may be accelerated as defense firma diversify their 
production and apply their advanced tachnology to more tditiond 
indwties. 
Partidm @oulty may be experienced in finding satbfactory 
reemployment for membem of the permanent ddeme force, many of 
whom leck traditional cidian industrial skills, are in &Ecult age 
group for placement, are accustomed to relatively high sdaw levels 
(taking into mount the imputed values of living accommodatiom 
provided), or have psraonality orientations not well adapted to 
humdrum civilian employment. C ~ a i n  &, on the other hand, 
may have outetanding civilian BW, plw a variety of attituda and 
experiencee which may be of epecid ueefulnas in civilian life-rn 
e.g., leadership qualities, abilities to endure discomforts, and howl- 
edge of foreign arm which might be partidarly useful in international 
ecponomio development work. 
As for the rank and fie workam in the defame industrim, not 
enough is y ~ t  known about thsir skill and wage levels to make a 
reliable appr&al of the diEicultiea they may experience in reemploy- 
ment. We expect, however, that a fair amount of retraining will be 
nemsary, much of it of a fundamental sort involving dwnentsry 
education. Policy decisions on the handling of such mattem are 
rendered very =cult by the paucity of reliable research in this field. 
Some of the experiments in retraining, such w thm~ by the Armour 
Company and in the Belgian coal mines, have been relatively un- 
succemful in the smae of showing a relatively smell number of workem 
wdhg and able to ben&t from t h ~ m  and the requirement of a large 
investment in order to produce a rather small rault. On the other 
hand, these conclusions have been criticbed as premature and the 
experimenb regarded as incunclwive by some qualzed obct ervm who 
believe that, by the use of improved teaching methods lrnd measures 
to provide incentiva, retrdng programs may aumeed better in the 
future. 
In the solution of regional problems them is an importmt change 
of e m p h h  which ha9 developed over the last quarter of a century. 
With the mpid rise in the cost of community facilities (housing, maea 
education and health facilities, and ao on) relative to the cost of fac- 
tories and equipment, with the lower proportionate crosts of transporta- 
tion and power, and with the increased rate of obdlohnce in plant 
and equipment, the case bmmes more and more persuasive for aiding 
new industry to  enter areas where there is an existing ekilled- labor 
farce, rather than seehg  to move unemployed workers to  where idle 
manufaoturing facilities are. It seems to be no muidant h t  moat of 
the European program8 have m~centrated on bringing additional in- 
dus- to structurally depressed areas, rather thsn helping tha workera rto go ahwhere. The new U.S. l@ation on depre~~sed mesa tdm 
the eame spproaah, aad experience gained under it should provide 
some useful guidelinw for area readjuetmenf policy under dis- 
armament. 
Bemm of the mnsiderabla concentration of def- industry in 
partioular IocaIitiaa, tha structural resdjuetment problame of the in- 
duatriw and the looditiesl are almost inseparable, and in aome -
the readjustment p b l e m a  may better be handled in tanrvl of the 
industries than of the mw. So fw we have relatively Iittl.8 inform* 
tion about the distribution of defense induetrg by region exmpt in 
relation to prime contracb and in regard to the Wwt C o ~ t .  Our 
information about tbe distribution by induatry is somewhat better 
and mey be more illuminating. 
An induetrid breakdown of the employment impacts ia provided in 
Table I. The big concentration of employment apecidy VUInerabIe 
to dhmnament wi l l  likely be-in very round n u m b 7 0 0 , O O O  per- 
sons in aircraft, another quarter million each in &pa and O ~ O B ,  
and another 400,000 in radio and other electr id  equipment and 
machinq, plus mother 150,000 in nonelectrical rnwhhq and in 
instruments. (Miwile employment is chiefly in h f t  but also in 
ordnance and electronim.) While another million and a q e  p
sons in other industrim are also likely to be dependent on defenee 
demand, this dependence wi l l  be for the most part id+&. Also, the 
90,000 or so who make the steel which antem dirmtly or indirectly 
into defense uam muld very well maintain their existing jobs after dia- 
armwent if alternative types of damand for quality and special steels 
muld be quickly built up. 
It ibl of intarest to examine tha extant to which di txmt  t~rpea of 
demand which might replace defmse demand would provide employ- 
ment opportunities for workers in t h w  particular indwtriea m a t  
likely to  s d e r  from a loss of defense demand. Thie type of 
has been pursued in the hntief-Hoffenberg article, "Economic Con- 
sequenm of Diearmament," in the A N  1961 Sch@& Ameka1~. 
-ntidy, this andpis proceeda by the use of what are dd 
"trade-off matrica" which show the net change in -demand for the 
output of particular industries if a given quantity of d e f m  demand 
is replaced by an equd quantity of other final demand-pmnal con- 
sumption, investment, nondefense Government services, or expo&. 
In general, the data prmented suggmt that an expansion of invest- 
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ment or capital exports would more d y  ntiliee the r e l d  re- 
murcas than muld other programs. 
Coneiderationa of this sort  would enpply a more relevant guide to 
policy in a crmh disarmament program, where structural pmbiems 
wodd be ao severe as rightly to dominate adjustment policy, thsn 
in the m e  of a deliberate and rnadmhly p a d  dissrmment pro- 
gram of the sort here undw mzmideration. Indeed, it ahould be the 
aim of policymak~ra, undsr these conditions, to resist the stmng 
political preseures which will undoubtedly exist to provide pswticular 
opportunities which will reemploy r e l d  r8~0umm with the mini- 
mum mount of change in the exieting indnstrial and gmppbia 
patterns. Rather, the opportunity ehouid be taken to faciliate the 
movement of r89oumm into those mupatiom, industria, and areas 
with the biggeat expanaim potential and which promise to make the 
largeet long-rn contribution to the achievmant of our nationd go&. 
A number of ~pe&c recammendations with reap& to structural 
d j u s b m t  policia may be drawn from the foregoing andpis of 
the problems. It k claw &st of dl that a great deal of what may 
have to be done in the event of dimmgment is along the m e  linm 
as what wodd be highly dmimble right now, dnce &e emnomy is 
already s&Iering f m  vnrious s t r u e t d  msledjuatments rrrieing from 
hchuicul chmga, population shifts, paat chmp in the cornpsition 
of the defense program, et oetera. Among the pmticular progrsmr 
upon wbicb a star t  can well be made in the near future may be included : 
(a) A atrmgthdng of our system of employment offices so as to 
provide a more complete, accurate, and up-to-date central source of 
knowledge about job openin@ and job avaihbilities. (A leading 
obstacl-d one not easily overcome--is reluctance of industry to 
list job avahbilitiw.) 
(b) A strengthening of our un%mployment insuranm program with 
effort9 to awure adequate minimum atanddm and a -tar d m ,  
of uniformity between S ~ W .  
(c) A stronger attempt to devdop a workable retr8:sing scheme, 
giving adequate mgnition to the fact that such retraining wiU oftan 
require particular attention to dementmy education and even such 
mattem aa Iiterwy and elementary arithmetic. 
(d) A more ambitious atternlit to explore the poteutid vdue and 
mats of a relocation program which may pomibly play 8 coneiderable 
role in highly specidid defem cmmunities which either have no 
worthwhite potential for nondefense production or which will take 
mme conaidewble time to develop altenmativa industrial o p w -  
tunities. 
(e) An open-minded ankdemtion should be given to the possible 
helpfulness of encouraging defense industry to adopt more l i b d  
provisions with respect to severenee pecy, e m  by makifin aome 
d o w n c e  for such progriuns m a Iq$timate mat in ddense cantrack 
(In fairness, tbe Government should then consid= expending war 
bendte to ita own defense fo- md c i d h  mployees.) 
(f) Similarly hdpful would be Qovermment attempte to influme 
industry to provide more h i m d  and flexible pmvigiom permi- 
the vesting of penaion righh, providing adended coverage with r+ 
spct to group i n m m ,  horpitdization, and perqdtee, 
and providing employew with company-wide righte of tmrisf~~. 
Mwures of this sort would be valuabie in removing &ting oon- 
stsaints on worker mobility. 
(g) Careful fittention should be given to the pdbility of B P ~ U T -  
aging defense cantractom ( m b l y  by eubeidizing their r e e d  on 
thme mattam) to begin making studiae as h their p o a ~ ~ e n t  
adjustments, including such tbinge as the typea of civilian itema to the 
production of which they could copvert with the least =oulty, the 
Iikely alternative employment availabilitim in their immdrrte com- 
munities, grad- of manpower and kinds of skill now on the staff 
which would probably be radundmt in a civilian economy, the new 
type of mmmh and development pmgmnfi to which they might hope 
f d y  contribute, their b c i a l  r e q h e n b  in the event of a mudden 
mu ti on of ddwe contmta, and the typea of financid &stance 
which they would h d  h&d, and so forth. 
(h) Knowledgmble people from defense industry have a h  auggeat4 
that Wcial proviaions in defense contraeta ~w~ defense 
industry to begin exploraMry work on r-arcb and development 
with mpeot to disarmament inspection requiremanta might be very 
helpful not only in developing advme-a plwming and capabilitia in 
this field (which could provide a d u l  type of o h t  p r o w )  but 
alee in cr&hg an atmo~phare of w a t e r  realism about the whoh 
subject of arms control snd disarmament, hdhctly einmurnghg other 
type8 of advance prepmation for such s contingmc:y. b t  but not 
lmt, the war& for technologid b ~ ~ u g h  in the field of inepec- 
tion is not n M y  a hopelees one, and any major achievements 
dong this line could aigPificaxltly add to the feasibility of &a~mrunent.' 
6 Thus, for example, an intemting researoh idea for the development of a new 
method for lwating buried objecta wae not fobwed up by one large defew 
contraotor bemuse there was no otEdal indimtion that s u l  devi08 if proved 
M b l e  would flnd a market. 
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The Spedal Problem of 
Research and Development (R&D) 
Reeearch and development may perhapa rate a separate dia*uwion. 
One can eonaider tbia peculiarly signiii~~flt for growth. It is clear, 
in any case, that the dispmportionatdy large impact which die- 
armament may have on R&D ahould be a matter of serious policy 
mnm.  About hdf of our R&D etFart ie financed by defense 
agenue9. 
Diaarmment would mrtainly csuae a slackening in the rate of 
growth of the R&D effort, and quite posaibly an dmolute decline 
in indtwtrhl R&D, if only of a temporaq character. Further, 
dthough basic mearch probably would not be too hard hit by dis- 
armament, the alipltion of national military development pro- 
grams would grqatly redurn the proportion of development work 
directed bwmd achieving major breakhoughs. A partial offset 
might be provided by the R&D program assooiabd with the inspec- 
tion md other activit i~ of the international control organiae;tlon. 
Whir% some reduction in employment of acientiste and engineers 
would appear to be unavoidable under these circumstttncea, there is 
every IikeIihood that this would prove to be only a shortrun phe- 
nomenon. R&D is one of the faatest growing activitia in our 
economy, and employment of scientiata and e n g h e m  b growing at 
a faeter rate than employment of almoet any other occupational 
p u p .  Although it ia h e  that during the late 40% and w l y  50's 
increasing defense R$D supwrt was the prime mover, since the 
mid-1950's nonmilitary R&D has grown at aa rapid a rate ae has 
military R m .  
A temporary dadhe in R&D employment, despite the diEcultiw 
it would cause to indhiduals and the possible interruptions it might 
muse in pmmising research activities, might have the important 
oflsetting benefit of facilitating o general review and reaseesmant of 
mearch goals and tl. new evaluation of the most promising u e a s  for 
concentrating future efforts. Along with this muld go s r e a l l ~ t i o n  
of researeh resources and personnel to areas where public twd private 
potential returns seemed to be the greatest. Some of these areas wilI 
require public support if they are to draw the appropriate share of 
oitr R&D do&, and new institutiod mangement~ for extending 
such support may need to be created. 
Since our problems in the fields of urban transportation, education, 
slld housing are longrun in nature, progrnms of expmded research 
in thme fields would undoubtadly merit Government support even 
though our chief ahortrun problems hare may not depend so much 
on tmhnological breakthroughs as on clearing away politid and 
other obstacles to  the application of misting technology. Other a r w  
wbere increased research might yield considerable long-term benefits 
to society include the exploration of space, the development of atomic 
power (especially from fuion pmcmea, if t h w  prove workable) and 
other unmnventional energy sources, the iodwtrid expIaitlrtion of 
our ocean resources, and a renewed attack on the related problm 
of cell chemistr~r, aging, and many forms of disease. 
Another area of vital political as well as humanitarian impwtmce 
which might possibly benefit horn a major orgmhed pmgram of 
mearch and development relata to the tachnological obstacleu to 
international economic development. Remarch and development in 
this area might attack such problems as: development and mgse 
production of teaohing mtachinea and related comrnunimtion equip 
ment ; solar engines; water pwiiication and other tmhniqum for over- 
earning aridity and restoring desert areas ; new methods of providing 
cheap power to remote areas; the elimination of tropid and other 
endemic diseases; population control; large batch production and 
transportation (perhaps in remodeled surplus nhipping) of eeseseantid 
nutritional dements widely deficient in tropical countries; and aye 
temetic techniquca for dective use of low-mat labor to mawproduce 
s h d w d  componenb required for economic development, ~uch aa 
roadmaking materids and machinery, simple housing and office build- 
ings, farm irnplernen ts, power spteme, and even simple macbiue tools 
and standard types of industrisl pIanh, and so forth. U.S. contribu- 
tions to economic development dong these lines would be one d the 
ways of fulfilling strong expectations in the underdeveloped countrim 
that resomm freed by d i a m e n t  would be utilized in part for the 
furtherance of international development. 
Programs such tu the above would entd a aignXc&llt shift of the 
orienhtion of R&D from the present pattern. Scienhb and exlgi- 
neem who have devoted their working carem to one field would be 
cded  on to switch to othere. It i not dear, as yet, how d y  our 
scientific resources are iishifhbfe" to new lines of developing inweat, 
but pmumsbly our. centem of higher education at leaat could &wt 
some ehift in their instructional emphaais to take account of new 
R&D fequirementa and opportunities. 
Such long-range and ambitious R&D programs might not only 
provide challenging work opportunities for a part of the man@, 
engineering, and &entifie resources now employed on defame projmte 
but would provide mnatructive outlete for international rivalria, 
whiah would d y  not dieappm with the advent of diaarmment 
and would a h  main& a healthy pmwe on our eduostiod 
aptem to turn out the i n d  flow of ht-rate acientiate and engi- 
neem upon which our ultimate W~CCWE in this competition will likely 
depend. 

"PrImarg fmpaot" reiers to dhat  and indirent data aa m w m d  by input- 
ou ut malpb but ignorfng ble multiplier &ecC or final demand o f f ~ h .  P" %he wumed reduetiom n expandit- we lo accord with the hypothetical 
model of e n d  and complete dlearmament aee Table 1x1) arr follows: 8 f $17.2 bdm: Btsge 11, $11.8 billion: Bt.as I IA, $9.1 biUion; Bt.gs 
billion. 
- 
Food and kindred produe@ apparel and textlIe mill roducta, leather prod~~ats, 
paper and allled pmduota rubber and rubber pmducta, Ember and wood products, 
nonme-c miner& and prmiucta, and mimeUaneous manufaaturing induistriee. 
4 Totdo not d y  e ual to sum of parts bemuse d rounding. 
8 Faded  o r c h  07 good. and d c a a  for ndonal defense as percent of 
total ~edenPpumb- of gaoda and aervias.  
& m a :  hatid-Hoffenbmg 1958 mtrix, ad'uahd to 1965. Table p 
by READ (lhemA Plognm on Economio Adjustments ta Dbrmmmzd 
TABLE I1 
BTATW LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE A RELATIVELY HEAVY 
ECONOMIC 1 MPACT FROM DISARMAMENT 
..... 
.. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  '6.2 4 1 
W&gton . . . . . . . . . . .  ' % 6  4 9 
New Medm . . . . . . . . . . .  a 1 . 7 9 . 0 
CalUoda . . . . . . . . . . . .  & 3 8 7 
Conneotiout . . . . . . . . . . .  9 . 6 0 . 6  
br l r~na  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  lao 4.2 . . .  Ukh .. ,...\..a:' :"'. . , , 28.6 B. 7 
~ o l o ~ e d o  . . . . . . . . . . . .  as c 7 
Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 1 2 . 8 
Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 . 5 5 . 2 
m t ~ u r i  . . . . . . . . . . . .  a o 2 0  
Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.9 & 5 
Mmmhueath . . . . . . . . . .  % 5 2 3 
Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 . 2 6 . 9 
IYA'PIOBA~I AVBBAO~ 2 2 2 9  
Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 2 10. 2 
N- ~ ~ p ~ h l r e  . . . . . . . . .  aaa 7 . 4 
&or* . . . . . . . . . . . . .  a 1.4 0. S 
Ahb- . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.2 6 . 1 
Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . .  = a  a 28.6 
W a t  of Columbia . . . . . . .  * Q 6  10 . 8 
South Carolina . . . . . . . . . .  0.4 7 . 6 
Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (9 I& 2 
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ('I 5 
I I I 
elwhodo oompoaeate, dm& and pwta, 8hipbuUng and m 
& ! i d  td *mplo~rment i. thas. i n d ~ t r ~ ~ ~  (ampi o*.oo~) i. mill- 
u&ion. Emplo nt in t h w  indmtriw and employment in m u -  c !  indud= o$%ployment in ham covered by ummplopmd i m a m ,  
""P moat of nuch employment is covewed. M tsrg and allow- and ddim Department of Deiem w8gm and *. 
InoompMe h a u s e  employment in defense industrim excludee employment 
whkh, in one or more of the induatrlw, wm not given by State since that would 
disoloee information ahut p s r t h h  hmi. For the whole country, the amount 
excluded from the 8tak-b -State dhtrlbutlon amounted to 13,WW) or 1.1 
of the toW employment h &or daf- induatria. Pm an i o d i v k d u ~ ~ ~  
ai mum, the exdudon might be much more Important. 
4 Between sero and 1 pemnt. 
a hxi than of 1 pemnt.  
*Not 8vsIlable. 
1961, p. f 8. Table prepared by READ. 
I 
 TAB^ IZI 
, .  MODEL OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE IlfBAEMAMENT 
-- - i 
r 
U.8. * --  
-8b-d 
r n ~ ~ ? r ! ! E ~  
~ 1 ~ ~ n i 0 p t u m - n  
U*& m#nm 
m a o n m l . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  ~ a n d m a l n ~ o l t .  
-ent (Ins mwu& & & 
velwmalt) . . . . . . . . .  
l l l r o r a f t . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mf& . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mwfwy spaoe . . . . . . . .  
me . . . . . . . . . . . .  
0th . . . . . . . . . . . .  
camtru&on . . . . . . . . . .  
. . .  M n l W  -QB 
Milkty  AE(1 . . . . . . . . .  
Civil dahm = . . . . . . . . .  
U.8. Dale-Total. . . .  
U.8. o w ~ u t i o n  b inferaatdod 4 
Inapeotion . . . . . . . . . . .  
MOB foroee . . . . . . . . . .  
Ihhrmnt foross . . . . . . . .  
Jr ld iMl  t ddntldmtim flme 
tfons . . . . . . . . . . . .  
U,0. aontribu&Tdal. . 
TOTAL D.I. E X P E N X ) m I  ON BE- 
OUIUTY PBOClRAM8. . . . . . .  
Assdated pro&t'am€i 
M M A . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  
a* AEC. . . . . . . . . .  
Ammdated pro@-6-Total. 
GRAND TOTAL. . . . .  
IMsarmamentmmamphna aminkmdedto be ~ o o ~ n t  w f t h h  u.a p r m .  
r D e f e m  expenditureedmatee medeb ELEAf)basdon Bureau ofthe 
Budget* ..otiona, publiehd in 8p&d &wd~ (h. 1961); George ~ W B  
un u&manuecri& "~~ ADttvitiea in Southern CWfornis in the 1QWe"; 
an$ corddatial ind- 80- 
a While a number of the eathiaka in Table XI1 .bvolve oontmvmbl 
asriumption of the 'Bureau of the Budget projections, published 19 8 p d  Budy 
Jan. IQBl), and the m t i m a h  for later yeam are b m d  on the mmption that 
In a @od of dhrmament the United 8tates would he glsd to adopt ang 
meamurn of a defdefe o~~ whfch would Inorasw ita IlysiEal ~ecurity and 
nut ba incompsklble alth the disarmament cement. &ey might Im viewed 
as a dsainNa form of hnranss agalmt -%e breakdms h tbp dllrmaulant , especially during a perid W o r e  dl nations were arhci athg. Nor 
E K u o b  a proam r4.w the deterrent povsr d the %aoa Pora; on t~ 
contrary it alone could render the exerob of suah power oredible. 
'The U.8. mntribution ta tL international wrntrol organization and the 
Pegoe For- L8 888tund b mer one-third of total con@ but no oharge 3a mum& 
tor wap- m taansimmt~ to the interpadond oonbl  organiaation 
or the Peaoe Fom. 
&ha than $60 million. 
4 Ekaludhg revolving h d .  

